Relative Wages, Efficiency Wages, and Keynesian Unemployment by Lawrence H. Summers
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RELATIVE WAGES, EFFICIENCY WAGES, AND
KEYNESIANUNEMPLOYMENT
LawrenceH. Summers
Working Paper No. 2590
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
May 1988
The ideas in this paper are developed much more fully in Summers (1988a)
where a much fullvr list of references to prior work is provided. I am
indebted to Larry Katz for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2590
May 1988
Relative Wages. Efficiency Wages, and Keynesian Unemployment
ABSTRACT
While modern economic theorists have produced a variety of
explanations for the failure of wages to fall in the face of
unemployment. Keynes emphasis on relative wages has not been reflected
in most contemporary discussions. This short paper suggests that
relative wage theories in which workers' productivity depends
primarily on their relative wage provide the best available apparatus
for understanding actual unemployment and its fluctuations. Such
theories are very closely related to the efficiency wage theories that
have received widespread attention in recent years.
Lawrence H. Summers
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138Keynes's General Theory in explaining involuntary unemployment advanced the
idea that "any individual or group of individuals, who consent to a reduction of
money wagea relatively to others will suffer a relative reduction in real wages,
which is sufficient justification for them to resist it. On the other hand, it
would be impracticable to resist every reduction of real wages due to changes in
the purchasing power of money, which affects all workers alike," (p.lte)
While modern economic theorists have produced a variety of explanations for the
failure of wages to fall in the face of unemployment, Keynes emphasis on
relative wages has not been reflected in most contemporary discussions, This
short peper suggests that relative wage theories in which workers' productivity
depends primarily on their relative wage provide the beat available apparatus
for understanding actual unemployment end its fluctuations. Such theories are
very closely related to the efficiency wage theories that have received
widespread attention in recent years.
Section I motivates and then lays out a simple relative wage model
describing the determination of equilibrium unemployment and highlights the
fragility of the equilibris that are likely to result when firms are concerned
about their relative wage. Section II develops the close relationship between
relative wage models and models that stress the role of insider power in
understanding unemployment. Section III shows how efficiency wsge modeia can he
extended to account for cyclical unemployment fluctuations once the rote of
relstive wages in influencing worker productivity is recognized. Section IV
offers some concluding observstions.-2-
I, Relative Wages and Equilibrium Unemployment
For simplicity, consider a labor market in which workers and jobs are
homogeneous. In addition to the virtue of tractability, these assumptions
reaove many of the ambiguities associated with the concept of involuntary
unemployment. If the labor market were perfectly competitive and free of
information problems, the demand and supply of labor would be equated. In the
competitive equilibrium, all firms would pay the prevailing wage, end any worker
would be able to immediately obtain work at this wage.
This very simple perfect competition model offers a manifestly
inadequate account of the labor markets. Firms do not act as if they face
perfectly elastic labor-supply schedules. Small changes in wages do nor produce
infinite changes in the available supply of labor. In fact, firms focus on
variables other than the quantity of labor available to them in setting wages.
A large institutional literature has documented that firms go to considerable
expense to gain information in order to set en eppropriete wage rate relative to
other firms in their labor market. In Chicsgo alone, more than 100 surveys of
the wages paid to clerical workers were performed in a single year, while firms
went to relatively little expense to determine how many clerical workers ware
unemployed. Most strikingly, even in settings where unemployment is high, firms
do not cut wages end sometimes even raise them.
The natural way for en economist to sccount for the observation that firms
sometimes raise wages even when they sre not having trouble staffing their
workplace is to postulate that reducing wages in the face of unemployment would
reduce profits. Profits may fall when wages are reduced, if reducing wages
influences productivity by affecting workers' effort, or by raising the firs's-3-
costs of recruiting, training and retaining its labor force. This is the
central theme of the burgeoning efficiency literature (surveyed by Stigtitz
(1986) and Katz (1986)) which spells out a variety of mechsnispis linking the
wages a firm pays to the productivity of its workforce. While the point is
rarely emphasized, most efficiency wage arguments suggest that rather than
depending on absolute wages, productivity depends on the relative
attractiveness of opportunities inside and outside the firm. Opportunites
outside the firm in turn depend on both the wages paid by other firas and the
rate of unemployment. Think about stories based on turnover, recruiting
workers' perceptions of what is fair as examples.
A simple functional form allowing for the possibility that increasing
relative wages raises productivity holds that:1
(1) 9(w•x)° OSa￿l
where 9 measures the effort put forth by the representative worker, x
reflects its workers' opportunities in a sense defined precisely belcw and a
measures the productivity-enhancing effects of paying higher wages. If aO,
efficiency wage considerations are absent. As a increases, they hecoae more
important.
The representative firm's problem is to choose a level of wages that
minimizes costs per unit of effective labor input, w/9. Differentiating (1)
yields the result:
(2) w*_x/(la)
which implies that the firm pays workers their opportunity cost if efficiency
wage considerations are absent but generally pays a preaium whose magnitude
depends on the the size of o.
Characterizing market equilibrium requires a description of how x is-4-
determined. A convenient functional form capturing the idea that outsids
opportunities depend both on wages-paid by other firma and on unemployment is:
(3) x-w(l-(l-b)u)
where u is the unemployment rate, w is the average wage paid by other fines, and
b reflects their relative importance in determining a workers' outside
opportunities. The value of b in a fully worked out model would depend
positively on the utility of leisure, the value of unemployment benefits, and
negatively on the duration of unemployment.
Substituting (3) into (2) and requiring that w—w, since all firms are
identical, we obtain a very simple expresaion for the market equilibrium
unemployment rate:
(4) uo/(l-b)
Equation (4) indicates that the equilibrium unemployment rate depends positively
on the size of the productivity-enhancing effects of wage increases as reflected
in m, and on the attractiveness of unemployment as reflected in b, Notice that
only in the special and plausible case where n—O will there be no unemployment
in equilibrium. Notice that the functional form used here has the special and
attractive property that the equilibrium level of unemployment does not depend
at all on the form of the labor-demand schedule. The labor-demand nurve only
determines the level of wagea. This is an attractive property of the model. It
is striking that real wages have doubled several times over the last century
without having a large impact on average unemployment rates.
Substituting plausible parameter values into equation (4), it is clear
that only small efficiency wage effects are needed to account for observed
levels of unemployment. Even if b—U, a productivity-relative wage elasticity,.5-
a, of only .06 is sufficient to rationalize a 6 percent unemployment rate. For
larger valuss of b. even smaller efficiency wage effects are sufficient to
rationalize observed levels of unemployment. Furthermore, the image of
unemployment suggested by the model also accords with observation in two
important reapects.
First, the unemployment generated here is involuntary arid socially
costly. In complex models it is sometimes difficult to sake the concept of
involuntary unemployment operationsl. But here its meaning is clear enough.
All jobs and workers are identical. All workers want jobs at the prevailing
wages but only some workers can get then. Furthermore, aince workers and firms
sre identical, the unemployment modelled here does not arise from desirable
reallocations of labor power to its highest value use. In this sense, it is
consistent with observations highlighting the concentration of unemployment
among a small segment of the population that experiences long unemployment
durations.
Second, the model is suggestive regarding differences between demographic
groups in unemployment rates. Those who value leisure highly and whose turnover
is quick are most sensitive to relative wages and will have the highest
unemployment rates, Think of teenagers as an obvious example. Alternatively,
think of constructioi workers who can easily move from job to job.
The determination of equilibrium unemployment in a general relative wage
model is depicted in Figure 1.2The equilibrium unemployment rate has the
special property that the representative firm optimizes by paying the prevailing
wage.At lower unemployment rates, the representative firm wants to pay a wage
that exceeds that paid by other firms. At higher unemployment rates, it desires-6-
to pay a wage that is lower than the wage paid by other firma. Notice that as
long as the representative firm would like to pay a higher than average wage in
the face of completely full employment, the market equilibrium unemployment rate
will be positive
Looking at Figure 1, it is clear that if the two schedulea intersect at a
narrow angle, small movements in either schedule will hsve a large effect on
equilibrium unemployment. For instance in the example cited above, a reIativey
modest increase in the value of the "unemployment benefit," h from .5 to .6
would be sufficient to increase the unemployment rate from 6 to 7.5 percent as
the WW schedule shifted upwards. The sensitivity of the unemployment to small
shocks is a consequence of the relative wage model's basic logic. Developments
that cause some firms to raise wages heve their effects magnified because each
firm's optimal wage is a postive function of average wages.
The principle, that concerns with conformity can lead to volatility and
instability, is a very general one. It must help to explain why the demand for
hula.hoops or Rubik's cube is so much more volatile than the demand for care
standard products whose value depends less on whether they sre used by others.
In the next two sections, I argue that conformity effects cen help to explain
why structural and cyclical unemployment vary so widely.
II, Relative ¶Jages. Insider Power and Structural Unemployment
The preceding diacussion has maintained the assumption that firms sre able
to set wages in order to maxinime their profits. A major theme of recant
discussions of unemployment particularly in the European context is the idea-7-
that wages are set by bargaining, implicit or explicit, between firss and
workers. Such bargaining obviously occurs in union contexts. Lindbeck and
Snower's (1987) insider-outsider theories suggest that bargaining may be
relevant in non-union settings as well. Lindbeck and Snower treat insider-
outsider theories as en alternative to efficiency wage theories in explaining
unemployment.
From the perspective of the model presented in the first section It seems
more natural to regard them as complementary, mutually reinforcing expanationa
for uneisployisent. The relative and efficiency wage considerations scresed in
the previous section magnify greatly any effects of bargaining power in two
reepedts. First, in the model developed above, firms reach an interior optimue
in setting wages. It is a property of such en optimum that sufficiently small
changes in wages have no effect on profits, and larger changes in wages have
only second-order effects on profits. This means that in an efficiency wags
environment, firms that are forced to pay their workers premium wages suffer
only second order losses. In almost any plausible bargaining framework, this
makes it easier for workers to extract concessiona.3
Second, a key aspect of any relative wage theory is that the optinal wage
for a firm to pay depends positively on the wages paid by other firms. This
means that when insiders raise wages at some firms, the effect spills ever
leading other firms to raise their wages. Katz and Dickens' (198]) survey of
the literature reports some evidence that, contrary to the predictions ofat
least simple competitive theories, the presence of--unions in an industry raises
the wages of both union and non-union workers. Similarly, it is often argued
that increases in the minimum wage lead to changes in other wages as well in-8-
order to preserve relativities. Relative wage effects on productivity can
explain why insider power can create unemployment, even if there are some freely
competitive sectors of the economy.
These two points can be illustrated by a simple calculation. Imagine thet
insiders at a fraction fiofall firms have the power to extract a premium of c
over wages at unorganzied firms. Then the equilibrium unemployment rate may he
calculated by solving the equations:
0 n
(5) w
(6) w°—5wm+(l-)w°)(1-U-b)u)/(l-a)
where w0 and wm represent respectively the wages in the organized and non-
organized sectors. This yields:
(7) u—(a+p)/(l-b)(l-t-i$)
Equilibrium unemployment increases with the size of the organired sector and
with the size of the wage premiums it can extract. The results of inserting
plausible parameter values are striking. Assume, as before, that a—Ui and
b—.O. Then, if p and $areeach equal to .15, insider power will increase the
unemployment rate from 6 percent to BI percent. Yet, union firms incur iahcr
costs that are only 6 percent greater than in non-unionized firms because of the
productivity-enhancing effects of wage premia.
The role of relative wages explains why unemployment outcomes are so
sensitive to small amounts of insider power. This comports with the common
observation that "corporstist" countries, where labor bargaining is centralized,
tend to have lower average rates of unemployment than other nations where
bargaining is decentralized.-g-
ill, Cyclical Unemployment
The basic problem in understanding cyclical fluctuations involves imolating
the impulaea and propagation mechanisms that cauaa the economy to fluctuate,
The relative wage approach to understanding unemployment developed here suggests
propagation effects are likely to be strong, and ao only smell impulses are
necessary to account for observed cyclical fluctuationa. In particular, the
equilibriadescribed in Figure 1 are "fragile, that is, very sensitive to
small diaturbancea. Small teal ahocks may have large effects particularly if
they are transitory and so do not affect workers' perception of "x' representing
outside opportunities.
The relative wage aodel here auggeata that unemployment will be very -
sensitiveto perception errors that might plausibly follow changes in ronatary
policies. Essentially misperceptions by workers of average wages shift the EE
curve in Figure 1 upwards. If relative wage effects are strong, even asall
misperceptions can have large effects. Imagine that the money stock is reduced.
but firma believe that the workers who still have jobs do not yet recognize that
equilibrum wages have declined. Then it would not he profitable for thea to
reduce wages to the level that would be an equilibrium if workera did not
misperceive their opportunities. Furthermore, firms that recognized that other
firms were not reducing their wages to the new equilibrium level would recognize
that they should not either, even if their workers were fully inforned.
This misperceptions story ia reinforced by two further considerations which
diatinguiah iteharplyfrom misperception interpretations of business cycles put
forward by classical theorists. First, the central problem here is one of-10-
coordination Notice that it is sufficient to prevent reattainment of
equilibrium following a shock, for some firms to suspect that some firms will
suspect that some firms will suspect that,, either workers or same firms... will
not assume that the new equilibrium is to be attained immediately. The
informationsl requirement for the costless attainment of a new equilibrius is
much more than individual rationality--it is common knowiedge that all
individuals will be rational.
Second, the plausibility of rapid adjustment is further undercut by the
observation that, at least in the face of an adverse shock, workers who are
perceived as ignorant of the new equilibrium wiil benefit, in that their wages
will not be reduced. This makes it even less likely that transitions between
equilibria will occur smoothly, The idea of persistent misperceptions is
supported by evidence. Caskey (1985) demonatrates that inflation was
consistently underestimated for tanyearsduring the 1970a and has been
conaistentiy overestimated during the 1970s.
The description of wage setting sketched here aeema more compelling than
the asaumption of sticky nominal wages that is contained in "Keynesian"
macroeconomics textbooks. Keynesian formulations have been successful in
identifyingreasons why firms might find it costly or undesirable to vary wages
continuously. But most of the reaaona they have given for wage rigidity are at
leastequally plausible as justifications for keeping the level of emplcyaent
constant and not firing workers during receasiona On the other hand, the
misperceptions idea stressed here explains why firms choose to adjust wages
slowly and fire workers when adverse shocks come. There is also the further
point stressed in some of the implicit contracts literature that layoffs help to-11-
educate workers who have jobs about adverse changes inmarketconditions.
An analogy developed in Summers (1988b) may be helpful in seeing the point
of this section. Daylight savings time is purely a change in the 'units used
in measuring time. Yet it clearly has real effects in the sense that stores
open at a different time relative to the sunrise because of its existence. Why?
Probably because most individuals care much more about being on the same time
standard as their neighbors than they care about what that time standard is.
Therefore, coordinating actions can succeed in achieving a better outcome inthe
summertimethan the market would generate. Much the same may be true of
expansionary policy during recessions.
IV. Conclusions
Unemployment,like cancer,is a multi-faceted phenomenon that comes in many
forms. But one would hope that theory could isolate aspects common to different
types of unemployment in different places and times. I suspect thac recognizing
the role of relative vegas in influencing workers' performance will help
economists in understanding different types of unemployment, Keynes emphasized
the volatility associated with situations where people try to guess the guesses
of others in financial markets. This essay has tried to argue that the lesson
is a general one applying to labor markets as welLFigure 1
RelativeWages and Equilibrium Unemployment
u
ww-12-
ENDNOTES
1.Thereare a wide variety of devices discussed in the efficiency wage
literature that firms can use to enhance workers' productivity without
increasing their wages. In considering the effects of wage changes, I
that firms have already optimized on all these margina.
2. A very similar discussion of the determination of the "natural rate of
unemployment" is presented in Johnson and Layard (1986).
3. The reaults of Abowd (1987) corroborate the efficiency wage hypothesis in
this respect. Taking a long horizon into consideration, Abovd finds that
surprise increases in wages resulting from collective bargaining agreements
reduce firms' market values by much less than the projected increase in labor
costs.-13-
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